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Background: This study aims to evaluate the length of time elapsed between reports of the same incidents related
to avian flu and H1N1 outbreaks published by the WHO and ProMED-mail, the two major global health surveillance
systems, before and after the amendment of the International Health Regulations in 2005 (IHR 2005) and to explore
the association between country transparency and this timeliness gap.
Methods: We recorded the initial release dates of each report related to avian flu or H1N1 listed on the WHO Disease
Outbreak News site and the matching outbreak report from ProMED-mail, a non-governmental program for
monitoring emerging diseases, from 2003 to the end of June 2009. The timeliness gap was calculated as the difference
in days between the report release dates of the matching outbreaks in the WHO and ProMED-mail systems. Civil
liberties scores were collected as indicators of the transparency of each country. The Human Development Index and
data indicating the density of physicians and nurses were collected to reflect countries’ development and health
workforce statuses. Then, logistic regression was performed to determine the correlation between the timeliness gap
and civil liberties, human development, and health workforce status, controlling for year.
Results: The reporting timeliness gap for avian flu and H1N1 outbreaks significantly decreased after 2003. On average,
reports were posted 4.09 (SD = 7.99) days earlier by ProMED-mail than by the WHO. Countries with partly free
(OR = 5.77) and free civil liberties scores (OR = 10.57) had significantly higher likelihoods of longer timeliness gaps than
non-free countries. Similarly, countries with very high human development status had significantly higher likelihoods of
longer timeliness gaps than countries with middle or low human development status (OR = 5.30). However, no
association between the timeliness gap and health workforce density was found.
Conclusion: The study found that the adoption of IHR 2005, which contributed to countries’ awareness of the
importance of timely reporting, had a significant impact in improving the reporting timeliness gap. In addition, the
greater the civil liberties in a country (e.g., importance of freedom of the media), the longer the timeliness gap.Background
The outbreak of Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome
(SARS) in 2003 alerted the world to the importance of a
timely global surveillance system for public health emer-
gencies with potential international impacts [1]. The glo-
bal pandemic was exacerbated by the initial delay in
information release by the Chinese government due to the* Correspondence: jeanfjtsai@tmu.edu.tw
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reproduction in any medium, provided the orfear of political and economic consequences and ended
with a total of 8,422 cases and 916 deaths worldwide [2].
The world first learned of SARS via ProMED-mail, a
non-governmental global electronic reporting system,
on February 10, 2003, a day earlier than the official report
by the World Health Organisation (WHO). However, the
reports by both systems were published 3 months after
the outbreak first occurred.
Previous studies have emphasised that timeliness is the
key to the success of surveillance systems and to
reflecting the time delay between response steps in the
surveillance process [3-5]. Surveillance and reporting. This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative
ommons.org/licenses/by/2.0), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and
iginal work is properly cited.
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disease control. However, the reporting process was
found to be frequently subjected to political influence
that affected the timeliness of the reporting and thus the
effective initiation of public health interventions [6-9].
As the main surveillance network of the WHO, the
Global Outbreak Alert & Response Network (GOARN)
was established in 2000 [10]. However, its efficiency is
influenced by geographical and timeliness gaps due to pol-
itical concerns [11,12]. As an alternative, ProMED-mail,
the non-governmental Program for Monitoring Emerging
Diseases, was established in 1994 to provide early warn-
ings about outbreaks based on information from various
sources, including individuals and media reports; further-
more, unlike the WHO program, ProMED-mail does not
require official clearance prior to posting reports [13]. As
one of the pioneers of internet-based reporting systems,
ProMED-mail is also one of the largest publicly available
reporting networks [6]. Previous studies have confirmed
its credibility [14-18]. In addition, the effects of reporting
in a timely manner (without political constraints) and the
efficiency of ProMED-mail in decreasing the delay in
reporting have been studied through comparisons to the
timeliness of reporting from the WHO [14-18]. Although
internet-based sources of information not only allow the
timely detection of outbreaks but also increase reporting
transparency, these sources still cannot overcome the
problems of non-transparency by authorities who delibe-
rately conceal information.
The lack of transparency for political reasons, lack of
consensus in policy and strategy and inadequate trai-
ning and resources for health system personnel have all
been cited as barriers to effective and timely global
health surveillance [7,19]. In response to the outbreak
of SARS, the 58th World Health Assembly adopted a
new set of International Health Regulations (IHR 2005)
on May 23, 2005 to close the gaps in the global health
surveillance system. As the only regulations for the glo-
bal surveillance of high-priority infectious diseases, the
revision of IHR 2005 responded to the needs of an ef-
fective global health surveillance system [6,20]. IHR
2005 not only included national obligations to achieve a
set of core surveillance and response capacities by elim-
inating technical, resource, governance, legal and poli-
tical obstacles in the health system, it also required
members to assess any public health emergency of inter-
national concern within 48 hours and to notify the
WHO within 24 hours to ensure the timely receipt of
the information. In addition, the WHO was allowed to
consider reports from unofficial sources, in accordance
with Article 9 [21]. Because public health events overlap
with trade and security issues, global health surveillance
issues have attracted increasing attention. However, the
effects of IHR 2005 on the reporting timeliness gap andthe association between transparency and the reporting
timeliness gap have yet to be evaluated.
The most pressing rationale for transparency in infec-
tious disease reporting is that open communication and
information can prevent delayed reports and responses
to outbreaks [8,9]. Transparency can be represented by
the extent of civil liberties and the circulation of public
information. Civil liberties are the rights and freedoms
that protect individuals from unfair infringement by the
government of the nation in which they reside and are
the basic tenets of democracy. Moreover, civil liberties
set limits on the government so that its members cannot
abuse their power and interfere unduly with the affairs
of private citizens. Countries with strong civil liberties
typically also have well developed mass media that is cap-
able of reporting infectious disease news promptly after its
occurrence [22]. Therefore, the public can receive infor-
mation about a disease outbreak earlier through media or
other channels in countries with better transparency. Con-
sequently, in countries with good civil liberties, ProMED-
mail might receive reports of new emerging infectious
diseases from individuals or the media and release the
information earlier than the WHO, which would likely
receive official information from the government at a later
time and post reports after receiving official clearance.
Given that the timeliness gap between WHO and
ProMED-mail in a particular country might reflect the in-
formation delay due to political constraints, we conducted
this study under the hypothesis that better transparency
would be associated with a longer reporting timeliness gap
between the official and non-official global surveillance
systems. Because the avian flu and H1N1 outbreaks were
the emerging global pandemics following SARS, we used
the reporting of avian flu and H1N1 outbreaks as the
focus of our study.
Methods
The components of the systemic rapid assessment
method, which represents the capacity for timely re-
porting, were analysed in previous studies with the
Systemic Rapid Assessment (SYSRA) Toolkit, a frame-
work that includes: External contexts such as demo-
graphic, economic, political, legislative, epidemiologic,
socio-cultural and technological factors; stewardship,
which refers to organisational systems and laboratory
and drug networks; financing, resource generation and
allocation; and healthcare provision and information
systems [23,24]. The framework provides conceptual
and analytical guidelines for the evaluation of health
systems and infectious disease control programs and
echoes the national responsibilities required by IHR
2005 [24]. Therefore, we collected transparency data
and measurements based on this framework for further
analysis.
Tsai et al. Globalization and Health 2013, 9:14 Page 3 of 7
http://www.globalizationandhealth.com/content/9/1/14Data source
The study was conducted from July 2007 to March
2010. To evaluate the timeliness gap between the public
and private global disease outbreak surveillance systems,
we conducted a comprehensive survey, obtaining the ini-
tial release dates of the reports for each avian flu and
H1N1 disease outbreak listed on the WHO Disease Out-
break News from 2003 to the end of June 2009and then
matching them to the corresponding outbreak report
from ProMED-mail. More specifically, we first collected
all avian flu and H1N1 disease outbreak reports released
on the WHO Disease Outbreak News website [25]. We
then looked for the same disease incident report on the
ProMED-mail website based on the information indi-
cated in the original WHO report, including disease
name, country, date of onset and other details [13]. For
multi-country outbreak reports from the WHO, each
country report was matched separately with its corre-
sponding report in ProMED-mail. Outbreak reports for
China, Taiwan and Hong Kong were also separated for
matching. In addition to the initial outbreak reports,
WHO Disease Outbreak News also posts reports that
are labelled as “updates”. These reports were examined
for details indicating the spread of the initial disease
outbreak to other regions of the affected country. Where
there was new information about the outbreak spreading
to other areas, we searched ProMED-mail for a mat-
ching report. Updates that mentioned only an increased
number of cases without additional information about
geographical spread were excluded, as were reports
about WHO technical meetings and epidemiological
survey findings. Additional information about the release
date and source of the reports in ProMED-mail were
also collected for further analysis.
Using this method, we collected a total of 423 matched
reports. After excluding the reports that ProMED-mail
received from the WHO, 322 reports were included in
the final analysis.
The research protocol was approved by the Institutional
Review Board of the College of Public Health, National
Taiwan University.
Measurements
Civil liberties scores from the Freedom House were col-
lected as indicators of transparency for each country. The
Freedom House is a renowned nongovernmental organ-
isation that supports democracy and freedom around the
world. This group evaluates the political rights and civil
liberties of each country on an annual basis. In our study,
we used only civil liberties as an index of transparency.
The 4 key areas of information gathered for civil liberties,
based on a checklist of 15 questions, include freedom of
expression and belief (4 questions), associational and or-
ganisational rights (3 questions), rule of law (4 questions)and personal autonomy and individual rights (4 ques-
tions). The total number of points on the civil liberties
checklists determines the civil liberties rating on a scale of
1 to 7, with 1 representing the highest degree of freedom
and 7 representing the lowest. The details of the method
are described in the methodology section of the Freedom
House website [26]. Although we collected the historical
datasets on civil liberties scores as well as the latest scores,
from 2003, we used the mean of the scores from 2003 to
2007 as each country’s overall civil liberties score. We fur-
ther divided the analysed countries into free, partly free
and not free countries according to these scores. Coun-
tries with civil liberties scores of 1 and 2 were designated
as free countries, between 3 and 5 as partly free countries,
and of 6 and 7 as not free countries.
In the framework of the Systemic Rapid Assessment
Toolkit, the Human Development Index (HDI) and the
density of physician and nurses are used as indicators.
Therefore, we collected the HDI from the United Nations
Development Program (UNDP) websites and physician
and nurse density data from the WHO website for further
analysis [27,28]. Comprehensive data regarding IT and
communication infrastructure were not available for every
country, so we did not include this parameter in the study.
Human development is defined as encompassing three
dimensions: population health and longevity, as measured
by life expectancy at birth; knowledge and education, as
measured by the adult literacy rate and the combined pri-
mary, secondary, and tertiary gross enrolment ratio; and
standard of living, as measured by the natural logarithm
of gross domestic product per capita (GDP) at purchasing
power parity. These indicators were collected mainly from
official statistics. The indexes of the three dimensions
were then expressed as a value between 0 and 1 by apply-
ing a general formula. Then, the human development
index was calculated as a simple average of the dimension
indexes, with 1 representing the highest degree of deve-
lopment and 0 being the lowest. Because the human de-
velopment index cannot be compared historically, we
used the human development indices from 2005 to repre-
sent the human development status of each country; the
human development index remained stable from 2003 to
2007. The detailed methods used to determine each value
are described in the Technical Notes section of the report.
In addition, the categories of very high, high, medium or
low development countries used by the UN were also used
in the study.
Information about the density of physician and nurses
each country was further collected from the WHO web-
site. The sum of these two numbers was calculated and
used as the index for the health workforce in this study.
We then categorised countries as having a high, middle,
or low health workforce index according to the sum of
the density of physician and nurses in each country.
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upper, middle and lower tertiles were defined as high,
middle and low health workforce countries, respectively.
Data analysis
The timeliness gap between the WHO and ProMED-mail
reports was calculated as the difference in days between
the report release dates for the same (matched) outbreaks.
The timeliness gap was further divided into two groups
with a cut-off point of 3 days, is in accordance with IHR
2005, which requires countries to assess and report events
to the WHO within 72 hours. Logistic regression was then
adopted to estimate the association between the timeliness
gap and civil liberties, human development and health
workforce indices, after controlling for the year.
All statistical analysis was performed in SPSS version
18.0 software.
Results
Timeliness gap by year
The results for the timeliness gap by year, indicating how
many days earlier events were reported by ProMED-mail
than by the WHO, is shown in Figure 1. Among the 322
outbreak reports, 272 were avian flu related, and 50 were
H1N1 related. The timeliness gap ranged from −37 to 54 -
days, i.e., reports in ProMED-mail appeared as many as
54 days earlier than the same reports from the WHO. The
overall average timeliness gap of avian flu and H1N1 out-
break reports from the WHO and ProMED-mail from
2003 to July 31, 2009 was 4.09 (SD = 7.99) days. The aver-
age timeliness gap of avian flu-related outbreak reports
was 4.96 days, while the average timeliness gap of H1N1
outbreak reports was 2.26 days.
Correlations between timeliness gap and civil liberties,
human development and health workforce indices
Figure 2 shows the reporting timeliness gaps in countries
as classified by civil liberties, human development status
and health workforce. The study results (Figure 2a) showed

















Figure 1 Reporting timeliness gap between WHO and ProMED-mail foH1N1 outbreaks was negatively associated with civil liber-
ties rating; longer timeliness gaps were found in the more
liberal countries. The longest reporting timeliness gaps for
avian flu and H1N1 outbreaks were observed in free coun-
tries, followed by partially free countries, while the shortest
timeliness gaps were in countries with low freedom.
The average reporting timeliness gaps for avian flu and
H1N1 outbreaks showed a curved relationship with human
development status (Figure 2b). The longest timeliness
gaps were in countries with very high human development
scores, while the shortest timeliness gaps were in countries
with medium human development scores, and the second
longest timeliness gaps were found in countries with low
human development scores.
The average reporting timeliness gaps for avian flu and
H1N1 outbreaks also showed a curved relationship with
the health workforce status (Figure 2c). The timeliness
gaps in countries with high and low health workforce
densities were 4.81 days and 5 days, respectively, while
the shortest timeliness gaps were observed in countries
with medium health workforce density (3.14 days).
A total of 206 cases from 43 countries were considered
to be reported in a timely fashion (timeliness gap shorter
than 3 days), while 116 cases from 37 countries had a
timeliness gap of longer than 3 days.
The correlations between reporting timeliness gap and
civil liberties, human development and health workforce
indices, as determined by logistic regression, are shown in
Table 1. After controlling for the year, the reporting timeli-
ness gap was found to be significantly associated with civil
liberties and human development. Compared with non-
free countries, partly free countries had a significantly
higher likelihood of having a longer timeliness gap for re-
ports of avian flu and H1N1 outbreaks (OR = 5.77), and
free countries had a 10 times higher likelihood of having
a longer timeliness gap than non-free countries (OR =
10.57). Similarly, countries with very high human develop-
ment status had significantly higher likelihoods of longer
timeliness gaps than countries with middle and low hu-
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(a) Civil liberties (b) Human development (c) Health workforce
Figure 2 Reporting timeliness gap between WHO and ProMED-mail for avian flu and H1N1 outbreaks in countries classified by civil
liberties (a), human development (b) and health workforce (c) indices.
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ness gap between WHO and ProMED-mail for avian flu
and H1N1 outbreaks.
Discussion
The reporting timeliness gap for avian flu and H1N1 out-
breaks decreased significantly after 2003, during a time
when newly emerging infectious diseases such as SARS
appeared. Furthermore, the timeliness gap was signifi-
cantly associated with civil liberties and human develop-
ment indices but not health workforce density. Better civil
liberties and human development were associated with lon-
ger delays in reporting of avian flu and H1N1 outbreaks.
Following the emergence of the global threat of SARS,
countries became increasingly aware of the importance
of timely reporting and the need for global collaboration
in infectious disease control. The sharp decrease in the
timeliness gap between ProMED-mail and the WHO re-
port presented in 2003 and 2004, immediately following
the SARS outbreak, is one reflection of this awareness.
With the development of this strong consensus, the
International Health Regulation 2005 was adopted. The
fact that the average timeliness gap of H1N1 reports wasTable 1 Associations between timeless gap and Civil
liberties, Human development and Health workforce
Variable^^ OR (95% CI) p value^
Civil liberties
Non-Free




High 6.29 (0.80-49.36) 0.08
Very High 5.30 (2.13-13.20) <0.001***
Health workforce 0.98 (0.85-1.12) 0.74
Year 1.40 (1.20-1.65) <0.001***
^p value <0.05** p < 0.01 ***P < 0.001.
^^the cut-off point of timeliness gap is 3 days.shorter than the timeliness gap of avian flu reports dem-
onstrates an increasing awareness of the seriousness of
not disclosing information regarding a “public health
emergency of international concern.” As a result, the
yearly average reporting timeliness gap decreased signifi-
cantly over time. However, this result does not reflect an
improvement in the timeliness gap between the real time
of an outbreak and the reporting time. In countries with
inadequate surveillance systems or with insufficient civil
liberties to release outbreak information, the shortened
timeliness gap might be meaningless for public health
concerns. Thus, further study is needed to understand
the relationship between improvements in reducing the
timeliness gap and the timely reporting of outbreaks.
Civil liberties were found to be negatively associated
with reporting timeliness gap. It is undeniable that WHO
reports are sometimes faster than ProMED-mail reports
due to delays caused by countries’ insufficient civil liber-
ties. However, given that ProMED-mail, the non-official
global surveillance system, can freely receive outbreak in-
formation from the media at any time, it is understandable
that the reporting timeliness gap between ProMED-mail
and the WHO was larger in countries with better civil lib-
erties. The finding that countries with greater civil liberties
have longer timeliness gaps is consistent with our hypoth-
esis that outbreak news is reported and disseminated more
quickly and easily by the mass media in countries with
greater civil liberties. However, official reporting can be
very much delayed due to the multiplicity of stakeholders
or the tardiness inherent in the reporting procedures of
bureaucracies in official organisations and systems [29,30].
Thus, further study is needed to better understand the as-
sociation between civil liberties and the reporting timeli-
ness gap.
Similarly, human development was also found to be ne-
gatively associated with the timeliness gap. In general,
countries with higher human development exhibited lon-
ger reporting timeliness gaps. Human development is de-
fined by a combination of health, education and economic
status indicators. According to previous studies, countries
with greater civil liberties tend to be more democratic
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education and better overall health. Within a developed
society, the complex process of administration undeniably
slows the standard process and operation of official orga-
nisations and systems [29,30]. Therefore, countries with
higher human development status have longer average
reporting timeliness gaps. However, it is important to note
that human development is not always a negative pre-
dictor of reporting timeliness. The shortest timeliness gap
was found not in countries with low human development
scores but rather in countries with medium human deve-
lopment scores. In other words, human development plays
a positive role in improving reporting timeliness for
countries in which development remained substandard.
Relatively poor health technology or health resources in
countries with low human development scores may ac-
count for this phenomenon. However, further research is
needed to better understand the relationships between
these factors.
No significant association between timeliness gap and
health workforce was found in this study. Although a
curved relationship between timeliness gap and health
workforce was found, no significant association between
timeliness gap and health workforce was indicated in
our logistic regression analysis. The significant correl-
ation between the health workforce density and the
human development index might be one explanation for
this finding. In addition, this phenomenon might reflect
the importance of public health efforts other than health
workforce density. Although an adequate health work-
force is one of the fundamental components of any
public health system, there are other important factors
related to reporting timeliness, such as the quality of
the health workforce, the awareness of unusual diseases
among the health workforce, and the overall effective-
ness of the healthcare system. Therefore, the lack of a
significant association between timeliness gap and
health workforce density in our study may be attributed
to these additional factors.
One of the important limitations of this study was its
cross sectional design. Although we analysed historical
reporting timeliness gap data, we used human develop-
ment and health workforce data from a single year to
analyse the association between timeliness gap and the
various factors. Thus, changes in human development
status and health workforce density from 2003 to 2009
were not accounted for in this study. In addition, the
sharp decrease in the timeliness gap between ProMED-
mail and WHO reports in 2003 may produce spurious
results. Moreover, the results of our study might over-
emphasise the effect of transparency on the reporting
timeliness gap because we were not able to analyse other
factors related to the timeliness of reporting, such as IT
and communication infrastructure.Conclusions
This study found that countries were aware of the impor-
tance of the timely reporting of outbreak data, as re-
presented by the adoption of IHR 2005, and that this
awareness had a significant impact in improving the
reporting timeliness gap. In addition, this study found
significant associations between the reporting timeliness
gap and civil liberties and human development. We have
discussed this phenomenon previously, as well as the need
to explore these issues in further studies. We suggest that
efforts to increase transparency should be considered to
further improve the global disease surveillance system. In
the meantime, we must also consider that even with the
best intentions, the release of disease information can be
delayed by complex factors such as the number of stake-
holders involved and the complex internal reporting sys-
tems of multiple official organisations.
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